Who are these Realists?
Posted by jenporter on January 11, 2009
In Politics, realism’s central hypothesis is that the state is the predominate authority on the international world stage, and being sovereign, is able to perform as an autonomous entity.
Not unlike the state, classical realists also emphasize the importance of power and self-interest, and disregard subjective moralistic considerations. They react strongly against notions of idealism and communities guided by virtuous and utopian political policies. Realists conform to the notion of the world as an imperfect place and conclude that in order to maintain control and authority, society should be governed by laws that are applied in rational and objective ways.
Politically, realists identify and deal with facts, as opposed to human assumptions. They are motivated by the pursuit of political supremacy and hegemony, particularly in foreign affairs. They are convinced that their actions and policies are impersonal and detached, and not subject to individual or biased disposition. Political realists seek to minimize uncertainty in world affairs (as it pertains to them) and maximize advantage and control for the state through systematic management. Applying stratagems that seemingly ignore moral principles is regarded as a necessary step in achieving a means to an end (such as the notion of freedom and democracy). Political realists understand that in order to achieve these objectives, power, in terms of military capacity or force may be required. Richard Nixon was a political realist who championed particular policies that constituted the core of his foreign policy. This balance of power proposed reconciliation with the Soviet Union, arms control, the opening of China, withdrawal from Indochina, and in typical realist fashion, the de-emphasis of ideology as a component of US foreign policy. However, these policies ultimately foundered because of Nixon’s personal shortcomings, especially his propensity for misleading the American people and Congress for the sake of short-term freedom of action and his own narrow political purposes.
Although realists aim for rationality and objectivity, they do not necessarily discount other compositions of human nature. They understand that people are made up of different facets and ideals incorporating elements of economics, religion and politics, therefore, they attempt to consider such convictions when determining domestic or foreign policy. Realist scholars such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morenthau however, remain critical and advocate that people and states must be forced into helping themselves and give priority to their own national interests and territorial defense before considering other idealist beliefs.
How can Realists divorce policies from other basic human tendencies such as morality and social values? Are they power-seeking wielders? Do they have an obsession with security and exhibit behaviours such as aggression and competitiveness? In some cases, yes. Former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, provided an ideal case for consideration of how realism operated in Vietnam. He believed that people were by nature, self-interested. He postulated that the war had created growing domestic constraints to the traditional policy of containment, and that accordingly, they needed to pursue a strategy of “global containment”. However, were his policies really based on the strategic importance of defeating communism, or on the effects a defeat would have on the United States’ prestige in the world? Did Kissinger actually weigh up the costs in lives and resources of deepening intervention, against the costs in reputation and notoriety of halting that intervention? If prestige and reputation are, as realists claim, the intangible balance of power, then in this conflict, the intangible weighed more than the tangible. This is how Kissinger was able to justify one military argument and frame the rewards of another. He was, in his decision-making able (or so he thought) to stand back and look at world affairs objectively and engage in “hard, ruthless analysis” (Carr, 1939).
Not much has changed post-Vietnam. The current administration in Washington DC is blatantly realist. Its disdain for international accords on the environment, chemical and biological weapons clearly demonstrates that. Former US Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, may have described himself as a “new realist”, taking into consideration principles of morality and freedom in Iraq. However, his motive remained elusive, for this version of neo-realist foreign policy appeared to simply mean being firm with other countries and ignoring their official opinions and national interests. In other words, there seems to be little difference between classical realists and neo-realists. Kissinger and Rumsfeld considered balance of power, but was regard given to the balance of economy or balance of society?
Perhaps people drawn to realism, only believe in one knowable truth – power. A more menacing consideration is the question of psychology. Maslow concludes that politicians drawn to power may require needs, ranging from psychological needs to safety needs (including the desire for freedom), to the need for affection and to a greater need for esteem. His conclusion is that politicians who tend to view the world as threatening and the phenomena which surround them as unmanageable without laws, are likely to react with “dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity – and to be inflexible in situations of crisis.”
Can there not be many ways of knowing?